The ABC News report above is included as supporting news documentation. Allegations discussed in the report remain contested, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia denies involvement in the September 11 attacks.
WASHINGTON, DC – September 6, 2026 (STL.News) Nearly 25 years after the September 11 terrorist attacks killed 2,977 people, questions about whether individuals connected to the government of Saudi Arabia assisted some of the hijackers are receiving renewed scrutiny as victims’ families seek additional declassification of U.S. government records and continue a landmark federal lawsuit against the Kingdom.
The renewed examination does not mean the U.S. government has concluded that Saudi Arabia planned or ordered the September 11 attacks.
No such finding has been made.
Instead, the current scrutiny is being driven by a combination of evidence obtained through years of civil litigation, previously classified FBI material, records obtained from British authorities, video and documents seized shortly after 9/11, and demands from victims’ families for additional government records to be released.
ABC News examined the controversy in a report published Sept. 3, 2026, as the United States approaches the 25th anniversary of the attacks. ABC reported that victims’ families believe recently obtained material strengthens their allegations of Saudi government complicity. Saudi Arabia has consistently denied responsibility for the attacks.
What has changed nearly 25 years after 9/11?
One of the most important distinctions in the renewed investigation is that much of the underlying material is not evidence that federal investigators suddenly discovered in 2026.
Some of it has existed for decades.
What has changed is how much of that material has become public, how litigation has assembled it, and what lawyers representing 9/11 families argue it demonstrates when considered together.
President Joe Biden accelerated the disclosure process in September 2021 by ordering a government review to declassify certain documents concerning the September 11 attacks. The order directed the attorney general, working with other federal agencies, to oversee the review and stated that greater disclosure could provide Americans with additional information about the attacks where the public interest outweighed potential national-security damage.
Separate litigation has provided another avenue for uncovering information.
The families’ lawsuit has generated years of discovery involving records, witness testimony and evidence concerning individuals with connections to Saudi governmental institutions.
ABC reported Sept. 3 that families are now asking President Donald Trump to declassify additional records, including telephone records they believe could shed more light on contacts involving Omar al-Bayoumi and two future hijackers. The White House told ABC that the administration was working to identify records responsive to the families’ request.
The Saudi question did not begin in 2026
Questions about Saudi connections to September 11 have existed almost since the attacks occurred.
Fifteen of the 19 hijackers were Saudi nationals, although nationality by itself is not evidence that the Saudi government participated in the conspiracy.
The official 9/11 Commission examined whether Saudi officials or other Saudi nationals assisted the hijackers.
The Commission ultimately reported that it had not found evidence establishing that the Saudi government as an institution or senior Saudi officials individually funded al-Qaeda.
But the investigation also examined several people whose relationships with the hijackers have continued to generate questions.
Two of the most important were Omar al-Bayoumi and Fahad al-Thumairy.
Their relationships with two future hijackers — Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar — are now central to the litigation against Saudi Arabia.
Two future hijackers arrive in California
Hazmi and Mihdhar arrived at Los Angeles International Airport on Jan. 15, 2000.
Both eventually participated in the hijacking of American Airlines Flight 77, which struck the Pentagon on Sept. 11, 2001.
Their initial period in Southern California has become one of the most heavily scrutinized episodes in the history of the attacks.
According to the 9/11 Commission, investigators considered whether Thumairy could have been a contact for the two men after their arrival.
Thumairy was associated with the King Fahad Mosque in Los Angeles and was an accredited diplomat at the Saudi consulate.
The Commission described circumstantial evidence that made him a logical person to investigate as a possible contact but concluded that investigators at the time had not found evidence that he provided assistance to Hazmi and Mihdhar.
That historical finding matters because it shows how the original investigation assessed the evidence available at the time.
The story did not end there.
The encounter with Omar al-Bayoumi
On Feb. 1, 2000, Hazmi and Mihdhar encountered Bayoumi at a restaurant in Culver City, California.
The circumstances of that encounter have become one of the central unresolved questions in the Saudi controversy.
The 9/11 Commission explicitly said:
“We do not know whether the lunch encounter occurred by chance or design.”
Bayoumi subsequently helped the two men establish themselves in San Diego.
The Commission documented that Bayoumi helped locate an apartment, assisted with the lease application, co-signed the lease, and helped the men open a bank account when the real estate agent would not accept a cash deposit.
However, the Commission must maintain an important distinction.
The Commission found that Hazmi and Mihdhar reimbursed Bayoumi for the certified check used for their housing deposit and concluded that Bayoumi did not give the two men money. The Commission said the hijackers had received money from Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the principal architect of the 9/11 plot.
Therefore, Bayoumi’s assistance should not be characterized as proven financing of the hijackers.
The question is whether the logistical assistance he provided was innocent hospitality or something more organized.
What the original Commission thought about Bayoumi
The 9/11 Commission investigated Bayoumi extensively.
Despite acknowledging questions surrounding his account of meeting Hazmi and Mihdhar, the Commission said investigators had seen no credible evidence that Bayoumi believed in violent extremism or knowingly assisted extremist organizations.
Commission investigators considered him an unlikely candidate for clandestine involvement with Islamist extremists.
That conclusion became part of the historical understanding of the Saudi question.
Later information complicated it.
The FBI’s subsequent 9/11 Review Commission revisited both Bayoumi and Thumairy. Its report acknowledged the earlier concern that Thumairy may have helped the hijackers establish themselves after arriving in Los Angeles and reviewed questions about Bayoumi’s meeting with them and his subsequent assistance.
Later declassified FBI records went further.
CBS News reported in 2022 that a declassified FBI memorandum said allegations concerning Bayoumi’s involvement with Saudi intelligence had been confirmed by information obtained after the original Commission report. Another declassified FBI memorandum cited a source reporting an assessment of a “50/50 chance” that Bayoumi possessed advance knowledge that the September 11 attacks would occur.
That assessment did not establish that Bayoumi knew the specific attack plan or that Saudi Arabia directed it.
But it significantly increased scrutiny of him.
Operation Encore continued examining Saudi connections
The FBI continued investigating possible Saudi connections after the initial 9/11 investigation through an effort known as Operation Encore.
The investigation focused heavily on Hazmi, Mihdhar, and individuals who interacted with them in Southern California.
Retired FBI agent Danny Gonzalez, who worked on Operation Encore, subsequently told CBS News that he believed Bayoumi was part of a U.S.-based support network for the hijackers.
Gonzalez and former FBI agent Ken Williams later worked with families involved in litigation against Saudi Arabia.
Their conclusions should therefore be treated as assessments by former investigators rather than current official FBI findings.
Videos seized after September 11 become important evidence
Another major reason the Saudi question has resurfaced involves material seized from Bayoumi in Britain shortly after the attacks.
British police searched Bayoumi’s residence in Birmingham, England, less than two weeks after September 11.
According to CBS News, authorities recovered boxes of evidence that eventually included thousands of pages of records and hours of video and audio material.
One video showed a gathering involving Hazmi and Mihdhar.
CBS reported in 2022 that families obtained some of this material through British legal proceedings rather than receiving it directly from the FBI.
Additional material later became significant in the U.S. litigation.
A 1999 video of Washington raises new questions
Among the most controversial pieces of evidence is footage Bayoumi recorded in Washington in 1999.
The video shows locations around Washington, including the U.S. Capitol.
The footage was unsealed through federal litigation and became public decades after it was recorded.
The Guardian reported that the video includes Bayoumi filming areas around the Capitol, including entrances and security-related features, while at one point referring to a “plan.” The newspaper reported that British investigators obtained the footage after 9/11 and provided it to the FBI.
Attorneys representing 9/11 families contend the video resembles reconnaissance.
Saudi Arabia and Bayoumi dispute the plaintiffs’ interpretation of the evidence.
The video alone does not establish that Bayoumi was surveying the Capitol for the September 11 operation.
Its significance comes largely from its context: the person who recorded it later became closely involved in helping two men who participated in the 9/11 attacks establish themselves in California.
The airplane drawing
Another unusual piece of evidence involves an airplane drawing accompanied by mathematical calculations.
Prosecutors recovered the material among Bayoumi’s possessions.
Plaintiffs have argued that the drawing and calculations are evidence connected to aviation targeting.
Bayoumi has offered an innocent explanation for the material.
ABC reported that families view the sketch as potentially significant evidence, while their interpretation remains disputed.
Again, the distinction is critical:
The drawing’s existence is evidence.
What the drawing means is contested.
There is no publicly established evidence proving that Bayoumi created it for the hijackers or used it to assist the September 11 operation.
A federal judge refuses to dismiss the Saudi case
The most consequential recent development came on Aug. 28, 2025.
U.S. District Judge George B. Daniels of the Southern District of New York denied Saudi Arabia’s renewed motion to dismiss the claims against the Kingdom for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
The litigation alleges that defendants intentionally participated in, sponsored, conspired with, aided, or materially supported al-Qaeda before September 11.
Daniels examined the extensive evidentiary record concerning Bayoumi and Thumairy and concluded that the plaintiffs had met their burden at this stage of the proceedings. His decision expressly allowed the plaintiffs an opportunity to prove their case at trial.
That ruling is significant.
It is equally important to understand what the ruling does not mean.
Daniels did not rule after a trial that Saudi Arabia planned September 11.
He did not find that the Saudi monarchy ordered the attacks.
He did not enter a final judgment holding Saudi Arabia liable for the deaths.
Instead, the court found that the plaintiffs had presented sufficient evidence for their claims against Saudi Arabia to survive the Kingdom’s jurisdictional effort to dismiss the case.
Saudi Arabia appealed.
On Nov. 5, 2025, Daniels granted Saudi Arabia’s request to stay proceedings involving the Kingdom while the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considers the interlocutory appeal.
The allegations therefore remain contested and unresolved.
Why Congress changed the legal landscape
For years, sovereign immunity presented an enormous obstacle to litigation against Saudi Arabia.
That changed after Congress enacted the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, commonly known as JASTA, in 2016.
Congress passed the legislation over President Barack Obama’s veto.
JASTA created an exception to foreign sovereign immunity under specified circumstances involving international terrorism in the United States.
The change allowed claims against Saudi Arabia to move forward under a legal framework that had not existed when earlier attempts to sue the Kingdom were dismissed.
The 2025 federal decision is therefore the result of years of litigation, congressional action and extensive discovery rather than a sudden reopening of the 9/11 investigation.
The funding question remains complicated
One of the persistent questions surrounding September 11 is how al-Qaeda financed the operation and whether outside governments contributed.
The 9/11 Commission’s terrorist-financing investigation concluded that the hijackers received operational money from al-Qaeda.
The Commission did not establish that the Saudi government funded the September 11 plot.
That distinction remains important today.
Evidence that Saudi citizens, charities, religious organizations or private donors provided money that ultimately reached extremist organizations would not by itself establish that the Saudi government knowingly financed September 11.
Likewise, evidence that Saudi government employees interacted with or assisted future hijackers would not automatically prove that Saudi Arabia’s senior leadership knew about the operation.
Those are separate evidentiary questions.
Three different Saudi scenarios
The evidence should be evaluated against at least three possibilities.
The first is the historical conclusion that al-Qaeda planned and financed the September 11 operation and that Saudi-linked individuals who encountered the hijackers did so without knowing their intentions.
The second possibility is that individual Saudi government employees, intelligence contacts, diplomatic personnel, or religious figures knowingly assisted extremists without authorization from senior Saudi leadership.
The third — and most serious — possibility is that the assistance represented activity knowingly authorized at a sufficiently high level of the Saudi government.
The publicly available evidence has not established the third scenario.
The current litigation is important partly because it may provide a judicial process for examining evidence relevant to the second and third possibilities.
Why Bayoumi remains central
Almost everything eventually returns to one deceptively simple question:
Was Omar al-Bayoumi’s encounter with Hazmi and Mihdhar accidental?
The 9/11 Commission could not answer that question.
It explicitly acknowledged that investigators did not know whether the restaurant encounter occurred by chance or design.
What happened afterward is documented.
Bayoumi helped the men obtain housing.
He helped with their lease.
He helped them establish a bank account.
He introduced them to people in the local community.
He possessed videos and other material that would later become the subject of intense scrutiny.
The unresolved question is why.
If Bayoumi simply encountered two fellow Saudis who were struggling to establish themselves in America and helped them out of hospitality, the episode has one meaning.
If someone directed Bayoumi to locate, receive, or assist Hazmi and Mihdhar, it has an entirely different meaning.
No publicly available evidence has conclusively resolved that question.
What Saudi Arabia says
Saudi Arabia has consistently denied responsibility for the September 11 attacks and disputed allegations that its officials knowingly assisted the hijackers.
Its attorneys have argued that the assistance attributed to Bayoumi was innocent and consistent with helping fellow Saudis unfamiliar with the United States.
The Kingdom has also challenged the plaintiffs’ interpretations of the videos, documents and relationships presented in the litigation.
Those defenses have not ended the case, but the court has not entered a final judgment rejecting them.
The dispute remains before the federal courts.
Families seek additional declassification
That brings the story to September 2026.
ABC News reported that victims’ families are pressing the Trump administration to release additional government material before the 25th anniversary of the attacks.
Among the records being sought are telephone logs that families believe could provide additional information concerning Bayoumi and the hijackers.
Brett Eagleson, whose father, Bruce, was killed in the World Trade Center’s South Tower, has been one of the prominent advocates for further disclosure.
Members of Congress have joined the effort.
ABC reported that Rep. Nicole Malliotakis, R-N.Y., was among lawmakers signing a letter seeking additional declassification.
The families’ position is straightforward: after nearly 25 years, they believe the American public should be able to examine more of the government’s remaining records concerning possible Saudi connections.
Has the U.S. government discovered that Saudi Arabia was behind 9/11?
No.
That is perhaps the most important conclusion for readers trying to understand the renewed headlines.
There has been no new U.S. government determination that Saudi Arabia planned, financed, or ordered the September 11 attacks.
What has happened is more complicated.
Evidence gathered years ago has become more accessible.
The FBI has released previously classified material.
British investigative material has entered U.S. litigation.
Witnesses have been questioned.
Attorneys representing victims have assembled evidence differently from the way it was evaluated immediately after the attacks.
And a federal judge determined in 2025 that the plaintiffs had produced enough evidence for their claims against Saudi Arabia to survive the Kingdom’s renewed jurisdictional motion to dismiss.
Those developments have reopened questions many Americans believed had been settled decades ago.
The unanswered question 25 years later
The historical record remains clear that al-Qaeda organized and executed the September 11 attacks.
What remains disputed is whether the organization’s operatives received knowing assistance from people acting on behalf of another government.
For Saudi Arabia, the most consequential evidence concerns individuals such as Bayoumi and Thumairy and their relationships with Hazmi and Mihdhar.
The original 9/11 Commission investigated those relationships but did not find evidence establishing knowing Saudi government assistance.
Evidence and investigative assessments emerging afterward have complicated that conclusion sufficiently that the matter is now the subject of continuing federal litigation.
That does not establish Saudi responsibility.
It does establish that the question remains alive nearly a quarter-century later.
As Americans prepare to commemorate the 25th anniversary of September 11, the families’ demand is increasingly focused on transparency: release the remaining records and allow the evidence to be examined.
Whether those records ultimately reinforce the established account, reveal misconduct by individual Saudi officials, or demonstrate something substantially more consequential remains unknown.
After 25 years, however, the history of September 11 is still being written.
Editorial note: This article reports allegations and evidence presented in federal litigation and government investigations concerning possible Saudi-linked assistance to individuals who participated in the September 11 attacks. Saudi Arabia denies involvement in the attacks. No court has entered a final judgment finding that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia planned or ordered 9/11, and no U.S. government investigation has publicly concluded that Saudi senior leadership directed the attacks.
