ST. LOUIS, MO – September 12, 2026 (STL.News) A growing collection of criminal cases, disciplinary actions and internal investigations involving police officers across the United States is raising a question that extends beyond the conduct of individual officers: Are some law enforcement agencies failing to adequately supervise, audit and hold their own employees accountable before misconduct becomes a public scandal?
Recent cases span dramatically different forms of alleged misconduct.
In California, two Oakland police helicopter pilots are facing federal charges alleging they participated in a scheme to fraudulently obtain aviation certifications.
In Washington, D.C., six current and former Metropolitan Police Department members have been accused of obtaining more than $441,000 in fraudulent overtime compensation.
In San Jose, California, an officer was fired after allegedly using a powerful automated license plate reader system to locate a domestic violence victim for a relative.
Across the country, dozens of law enforcement officials have been accused of improperly using Flock Safety cameras and other automated license plate reader systems to track girlfriends, spouses, former romantic partners and acquaintances.
And in several instances, the questionable activity continued for months or years before supervisors discovered it.
The individual allegations differ, but collectively they raise broader questions about police management systems: Who reviews an officer’s database searches? Who verifies overtime? Who confirms specialized credentials? Who monitors employees with access to surveillance technology? And how quickly should unusual patterns generate a supervisory review?
The answers increasingly matter not only to taxpayers but also to public confidence in law enforcement.
San Jose officer fired over Flock use
The most recent case involves the San Jose Police Department.
Police Chief Paul Joseph said an officer was terminated after an investigation determined the officer improperly used the department’s Flock Safety automated license plate reader system while off duty to locate a domestic violence victim.
The officer allegedly used a personal device to obtain the information and provided the victim’s location to a relative who was allegedly involved in the domestic violence matter.
The alleged misuse apparently did not surface at first because an automated management control flagged the officer.
Instead, the victim became suspicious because the alleged abuser appeared to know her whereabouts and reported her concerns to police.
San Jose subsequently investigated the officer’s searches, placed the officer on administrative leave, and ultimately terminated the employee. Current reporting has not publicly identified the officer.
The department has since prohibited employees from using personal devices to access Flock and other sensitive law enforcement systems, increased auditing capabilities, and referred the officer’s conduct to California’s Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training.
The corrective actions are significant.
But they also raise an unavoidable management question: Why was an off-duty officer able to access such a sensitive surveillance system from a personal device in the first place?
Flock misuse has become a national issue
San Jose is far from an isolated case.
A Washington Post investigation published in August identified at least 69 law enforcement officials accused, criminally charged, or convicted of misusing automated license plate readers for unauthorized purposes.
In at least 15 cases the newspaper examined, someone outside the police department first identified the potential misconduct rather than ordinary departmental oversight.
The distinction is important.
Automated license plate readers can be enormously valuable investigative tools. Cameras positioned along roads capture license plate information and other vehicle characteristics and can allow investigators to quickly locate stolen vehicles, identify suspects or reconstruct vehicle movements associated with serious crimes.
San Jose police demonstrated that legitimate value almost simultaneously with the misconduct controversy when automated license plate reader information was reportedly used to help locate a vehicle involved in a fatal hit-and-run.
The problem is not necessarily the technology’s existence.
The management problem arises when powerful surveillance tools are made available without equally powerful controls governing who can use them, why they can search, who reviews those searches, and what happens when an employee repeatedly accesses information unrelated to an investigation.
Thousands of searches involving an ex-girlfriend
One of the clearest examples surfaced this week in Albany County, New York.
Senior Sheriff’s Investigator Laurie Moore was arrested after authorities said she conducted more than 4,000 unauthorized database searches involving five people she knew.
Approximately 3,000 of those searches allegedly involved her former girlfriend.
Moore was charged with second-degree falsifying business records and official misconduct. The charges are allegations, and she is presumed innocent unless proven guilty.
The investigation reportedly began after an outside source brought information to the department.
After learning of the allegations, Sheriff Craig Apple ordered a broader audit, suspended Moore and tightened controls over Flock access. A supervisor was also reportedly suspended, while the sheriff’s office moved toward monthly audits and more restrictive access procedures.
Again, the number of searches raises a management issue separate from the alleged conduct itself.
Thousands of database queries create a pattern.
The question is whether police agencies possess systems designed to recognize those patterns before an outsider reports them.
Georgia provides evidence audits can work
Not every recent case demonstrates management failure.
Georgia provides several important examples showing that internal auditing can expose suspected misuse.
The Georgia Bureau of Investigation announced July 6 that it had arrested five former Albany Police Department officers after an internal audit of the department’s Flock system.
The officers were accused of using retained license plate information for non-law enforcement purposes. Charges included misusing license plate data and violating their oath of office.
The Albany Police Department itself requested the GBI investigation after identifying questionable activity.
Later that month, the Conyers Police Department requested a GBI investigation after another internal Flock audit.
Dispatcher supervisor Paige Forte was subsequently accused of accessing Flock more than 30 times between April and July for purposes unrelated to law enforcement.
Savannah provides another example.
On Aug. 21, the GBI announced charges against four former Savannah Police Department employees following an internal audit of Flock usage.
Three were former police officers, while another worked as a community service specialist. Investigators alleged the employees used Flock for non-law-enforcement purposes.
Savannah police identified the issue internally and requested the outside investigation.
These cases demonstrate an important counterpoint.
Police management cannot necessarily prevent every employee from attempting misconduct.
But management can create systems that can identify suspicious behavior.
That difference may determine whether misconduct lasts days, months or years.
Former employee allegedly retained access
Another Georgia case illustrates a different access-control problem.
Former Ogeechee Circuit District Attorney’s Office investigator Andrae Wright was arrested in July on allegations including stalking, computer invasion of privacy, violation of oath of office and misuse of a license plate reader system.
According to the GBI, Wright previously worked for the Effingham County Sheriff’s Office but still had access to that agency’s Flock account.
Investigators alleged he accessed Flock more than 60 times over approximately three weeks for purposes unrelated to law enforcement.
That case raises one of the most basic questions in information security:
Why does an employee continue to have access to sensitive systems after leaving an organization?
Private businesses routinely terminate access to email, financial systems, customer databases, and internal networks when an employee leaves.
Police surveillance databases arguably warrant at least that level of protection because they can reveal where people travel, shop, work, or spend time.
More Georgia arrests followed
The number of Georgia cases continued to grow through the summer.
Former Polk County police Officer Tracey Royston was charged in August with four misdemeanor counts of misuse of a license plate reader system after investigators alleged she accessed Flock multiple times during 2024 and 2025 for non-law-enforcement purposes.
Former Dallas Police Department 911 Director Heidi Taylor was charged with two misdemeanor counts after investigators alleged she accessed Flock for non-law-enforcement purposes during 2024 and 2025.
On Sept. 1, Georgia Department of Corrections Special Agent in Charge Robert “Bobby” Michael Keim was arrested and accused of improperly using the agency’s Flock system.
The following day, the GBI announced the arrest of Clayton County Sheriff’s Deputy Errol Farrell Jr. on another allegation of license plate reader misuse.
The Georgia cases are especially instructive because they demonstrate both sides of the accountability question.
There appears to have been repeated misuse by individual law enforcement employees.
But multiple departments also used internal audits to uncover questionable activity and requested independent GBI investigations.
That is evidence of oversight working, not failing.
Columbus pauses its entire Flock program
Other cities are reconsidering whether their existing safeguards are sufficient.
Columbus, Ohio, suspended its Flock camera program this month after allegations that a police officer repeatedly searched a particular license plate without an apparent law enforcement purpose.
Mayor Andrew Ginther ordered a broader audit while the program was paused.
The decision effectively acknowledges a central reality surrounding police surveillance technology: Public confidence in the technology depends on confidence in the people authorized to use it.
Flock is strengthening controls
Flock Safety has also responded to growing concerns.
The company announced in August that officers would be required to link searches to criminal case numbers and that searches would be subject to automatic abnormal-activity screening.
The company’s abnormal-activity feature had previously been optional and, according to Flock, was being used by about one-third of approximately 7,000 law enforcement customers.
That statistic points directly to the management issue.
A surveillance system can maintain logs showing what employees search.
But logs accomplish little if nobody examines them.
Requiring officers to enter a reason for a search may also be inadequate unless a supervisor can verify that the search corresponds to an actual investigation.
Effective oversight requires controls that are independent of the employee being monitored.
Oakland helicopter pilots face federal charges
Surveillance databases are only one part of the accountability problem.
Oakland Police Department helicopter pilots Brandon Mart and David Mac are facing federal charges alleging they conspired with Federal Aviation Administration safety inspector William Miller to fraudulently obtain aviation certifications.
Federal prosecutors allege they submitted false documents involving aviation “checkrides,” practical examinations used to show pilots have the skills required for certification.
Prosecutors contend Mart received three fraudulent certifications and Mac received one.
The officers pleaded not guilty and have been placed on administrative leave.
They are presumed innocent unless proven guilty.
Oakland Police Chief James Beere said the department learned about the federal charges when they became public and then placed the employees on leave.
The allegations are particularly significant because pilots operating police aircraft hold highly specialized positions involving public safety.
That raises another management question:
How extensively should a police agency independently verify the professional certifications of employees placed in specialized assignments?
Departments understandably rely upon outside certification authorities such as the FAA.
But when qualifications relate directly to operating public safety aircraft, agencies may need systems that verify not simply that a credential exists, but that it was validly obtained and remains current.
$441,000 alleged overtime fraud in Washington
The issue extends to police payroll.
Six current and former Washington Metropolitan Police Department members were charged in August in connection with an alleged overtime fraud scheme.
Authorities allege they claimed overtime while outside Washington, including during domestic and international travel, claimed overtime while on annual leave, forged supervisory signatures, and manipulated administrative processes used to approve payments.
The Washington Post reported that prosecutors allege more than $441,000 in fraudulent overtime compensation was paid.
The allegations have not been proven in court, and each defendant is presumed innocent.
This case differs from some surveillance cases.
According to the District of Columbia attorney general, Metropolitan Police Department Internal Affairs identified irregularities in overtime submissions, helping trigger the investigation.
That suggests internal controls eventually worked.
But the amount allegedly paid before the scheme was detected shows the financial consequences when controls don’t flag questionable claims quickly.
New Orleans officer accused of $111,000 overtime fraud
Washington is not the only recent overtime case.
Louisiana State Police announced Aug. 7 that New Orleans Senior Police Officer Brandon Coleman had been arrested following a payroll fraud investigation.
Investigators alleged discrepancies existed between overtime Coleman reported and the hours he actually worked. They also alleged his reported work locations did not match his actual locations during some overtime periods.
Authorities concluded Coleman received more than $111,000 in fraudulent overtime payments between December 2024 and December 2025.
Coleman is presumed innocent unless proven guilty.
Again, payroll systems generate records.
The accountability question is how aggressively those records are compared with schedules, leave records, vehicle location information, assignments, and other independently verifiable information.
Oakland audit catches alleged time theft
Oakland provides another useful contrast.
Police Sgt. Kevin Arias was charged with felony grand theft after authorities alleged he falsified time records and improperly received approximately $38,000.
But unlike some cases in which outsiders uncovered misconduct, Oakland said it discovered the issue during a routine audit of employee timesheets.
The department subsequently increased the frequency of its timesheet audits and said it was exploring additional technology to reduce the potential for misconduct.
Arias is presumed innocent unless proven guilty.
That case illustrates precisely what accountability systems are supposed to do.
Misconduct may still occur.
But a properly functioning audit system increases the probability that it will be discovered internally.
Phoenix officers accused in unreported traffic stop
Another August case demonstrates the challenge of supervising officers working outside direct observation.
Two Phoenix police officers were fired and arrested after authorities alleged they assaulted a man and woman during an Aug. 5 traffic stop, used a Taser and failed to activate their body-worn cameras or report the stop.
Investigators ultimately used other evidence, including city vehicle location information, to establish probable cause.
Both former officers face criminal charges and are presumed innocent unless proven guilty.
Body cameras themselves are accountability systems.
But a camera cannot provide accountability when an employee deliberately fails to activate it.
The next layer of management must therefore detect unusual missing recordings, unexplained vehicle movements, unreported encounters, or discrepancies between dispatch information and officer activity.
San Francisco discovers nearly 300 improper searches
Institutional controls can also fail even when individual officers are not accused of malicious behavior.
San Francisco police announced in June that an audit found its Flock license plate reader network had been improperly searched nearly 300 times for federal and out-of-state agencies.
California law limits such sharing without specified judicial authorization.
Police said the searches represented only about 0.005% of overall searches and found no searches related to immigration enforcement or reproductive rights investigations.
After discovering the problem, San Francisco police terminated the affected outside access and reviewed its procedures.
The case illustrates why audits matter even when nobody is accused of personally exploiting information.
Complex data-sharing arrangements can create compliance failures that departments may not discover without systematic review.
Accountability cannot depend entirely on personal integrity
Law enforcement necessarily gives police officers extraordinary powers.
They can detain people.
They can make arrests.
They can use force under legally defined circumstances.
They can access confidential government databases.
They can increasingly search enormous networks that show where vehicles have traveled.
They may collect substantial overtime and work with comparatively limited direct supervision during much of a shift.
Most police employees may never abuse those powers.
But an effective management system cannot assume that every employee will always act ethically simply because most employees do.
Banks audit financial transactions.
Hospitals control access to patient records.
Corporations monitor privileged computer accounts.
Airlines verify pilot qualifications.
Government agencies audit financial expenditures.
Police agencies entrusted with surveillance databases, weapons, arrest authority, and taxpayer money require equally rigorous internal controls.
The issue is management as much as misconduct
The increasing number of cases should not be interpreted as evidence that American police officers collectively lack integrity.
Hundreds of thousands of law enforcement officers serve across the country, and misconduct involving a comparatively small group cannot fairly establish the character of an entire profession.
But the cases do establish something else.
Police agencies must assume misconduct is possible.
Management’s responsibility is therefore not merely to punish employees after misconduct becomes public.
It is to design systems that can detect suspicious behavior early.
For surveillance databases, that could mean automated anomaly detection, verified case numbers, regular supervisory audits, and immediate termination of access when employment or assignments change.
For overtime, it could mean comparing claims against leave records, schedules, vehicle location data, and actual assignments.
For specialized positions, it could mean independently verifying professional credentials.
For body cameras, it could mean automated reviews of unexplained recording gaps.
And for every system, responsibility needs to belong to a clearly identified supervisor or auditing unit.
Without those controls, police departments risk becoming dependent on victims, journalists, whistleblowers, or prosecutors to identify misconduct after damage has already occurred.
Public trust depends on what happens before the scandal
Police chiefs routinely invoke public trust when announcing arrests or disciplinary actions against their own employees.
Those statements matter.
Departments should receive credit when they investigate their own personnel, refer cases for prosecution, and publicly acknowledge wrongdoing.
But public trust increasingly depends on something more difficult to measure:
What was management doing before the misconduct became a headline?
Was someone reviewing the searches?
Was someone checking the overtime?
Was someone verifying the credentials?
Was someone examining abnormal employee behavior?
And did supervisors have the information necessary to identify a pattern before a victim, newspaper, prosecutor or outside investigator did?
The recent cases involving San Jose, Oakland, Washington, Albany County, Phoenix, New Orleans, and numerous agencies in Georgia do not prove that police departments nationwide are fundamentally corrupt.
They do, however, provide substantial evidence that modern police accountability cannot rely exclusively on officers policing themselves through personal integrity.
Powerful institutions require powerful internal controls.
When those controls work, misconduct can be caught internally.
When they do not, thousands of unauthorized searches, hundreds of thousands of dollars in questionable overtime, or potentially fraudulent professional credentials can remain undiscovered until someone outside the normal chain of command starts asking questions.
For police departments across the country, that may be the larger lesson behind the rapidly accumulating headlines.
Editor’s note: Criminal charges and allegations referenced in this report do not constitute findings of guilt. Defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty in a court of law.
