Strait of Hormuz – The territorial dispute between Iran and the United Arab Emirates over three micro-islands in the Strait of Hormuz—Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb—has shifted from a decades-long diplomatic stalemate to an active theater of global conflict. Located directly adjacent to the Persian Gulf’s deepest commercial shipping lanes, these islands afford their possessor unparalleled control over a transit route responsible for one-fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) traffic. Historically seized by Iran in 1971, the islands have been heavily fortified into military garrisons that act as static naval platforms. Following recent geopolitical hostilities involving U.S. airstrikes and maritime blockades, understanding the history, strategic placement, and international legal positions regarding these islands remains vital for assessing the future of international energy security and Middle Eastern stability.
Strait of Hormuz – Introduction: The Micro-Islands with Macro Significance
July 16, 2026 (STL.News) Strait of Hormuz – In the study of global geopolitics, geographic scale rarely correlates directly with strategic value. Nowhere is this paradox more evident than at the western approach to the Strait of Hormuz, where three tiny, rocky landmasses—Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb—sit directly inside one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints. Together, these three islands encompass an aggregate landmass of just about 10 square miles (25 square kilometers). They possess minimal civilian populations, scarce freshwater resources, and virtually no agricultural output.
Yet, despite their physical insignificance, these islands have been the center of a bitter sovereignty dispute between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for more than half a century. The strategic gravity of these outposts stems entirely from their location: they overlook the deep-water shipping channels through which roughly 20% to 25% of global seaborne petroleum and a fifth of liquefied natural gas (LNG) must pass daily.
For fifty years, this friction remained a relatively managed diplomatic disagreement, characterized by annual protestations at the United Nations General Assembly and periodic diplomatic maneuvering. However, recent military escalations in the region—culminating in targeted daylight airstrikes by U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) against fortification networks on Greater Tunb—have thrust the islands back into the center of international security calculations. To understand why these three islands have the potential to destabilize the global energy economy, one must analyze their precise geography, complex colonial and regional histories, and utility as modern military strongpoints.
1. Geographic Profiles: The Sentinels of the Shipping Lanes
To appreciate the tactical advantage the islands confer, it is necessary to examine their specific layout and physical characteristics within the Persian Gulf. The entry into the Strait of Hormuz is naturally shallow and highly restrictive for modern, deep-draft supertankers. The deepest, safest, and most efficient channels for inbound and outbound commercial vessels pass directly between and around these three features.
[ PERSIAN GULF ]
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???? Lesser Tunb (Military outpost, no freshwater)
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???? Greater Tunb (Fortified base, airstrips, missile sites)
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???? Abu Musa (Largest island, civilian population, joint oil fields)
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[ STRAIT OF HORMUZ ] ???> To Gulf of Oman / Indian Ocean
Abu Musa
Abu Musa is the largest of the three islands, measuring roughly 4.6 square miles. Positioned further south than the Tunbs, it lies approximately 43 miles north of the UAE emirate of Sharjah and about 50 miles south of the Iranian mainland. Abu Musa is unique among the trio because it possesses a permanent civilian population, historically divided between an Emirati village and an Iranian military settlement. Geologically, the island boasts significant deposits of red iron oxide. More importantly, it is surrounded by the lucrative Mubarak offshore oil and gas field, granting the sovereign power extensive economic rights to adjacent seabed resources.
Greater Tunb (Tunb al-Kubra)
Located roughly 17 miles by tunnel distance from the Iranian island of Qeshm and 46 miles from the UAE emirate of Ras al-Khaimah, Greater Tunb covers approximately 3.5 square miles. The island is low-lying, semi-arid, and historically supported minor seasonal grazing by local fishermen. Today, its landscape is defined entirely by military infrastructure, including reinforced bunkers, radar installations, and an operational runway.
Lesser Tunb (Tunb al-Sughra)
Situated approximately 7 miles west of Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb is a microscopic, rocky outcrop measuring a fraction of a square mile. The island features incredibly rugged terrain, lacks any natural freshwater source, and is completely uninhabitable for civilians. Its utility is strictly observational and defensive, serving as a forward lookout post for naval forces stationed in the Gulf.
2. Historical Origins of the Dispute: The 1971 Seizure
The roots of the modern sovereignty battle reside in the twilight of the British colonial era in the Middle East. Throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, Great Britain maintained a series of protectorate treaties with the small maritime principalities along the southern coast of the Persian Gulf, known collectively as the Trucial States. During this period of British hegemony, the islands of Greater and Lesser Tunb were recognized as territories belonging to the Sheikhdom of Ras al-Khaimah, while Abu Musa was recognized as belonging to the Sheikhdom of Sharjah.
As the United Kingdom prepared for a complete military withdrawal from east of Suez by the end of 1971, the geopolitical vacuum triggered intense regional maneuvering. The Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi—who was heavily backed by the United States as a regional bulwark against Soviet expansion and Arab nationalism—vowed to reassert historic Iranian control over the islands before the British departed. Iran claimed that the islands had been unjustly detached from Persian administration by British colonial cartographers in the late 19th century.
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| CHRONOLOGY OF OCCUPATION |
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| Nov 29, 1971 | Sharjah signs a temporary MoU with Imperial Iran regarding|
| | joint administrative custody over Abu Musa. |
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| Nov 30, 1971 | Imperial Iranian Navy launches amphibious landings, |
| | forcibly occupying Greater and Lesser Tunb. |
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| Dec 02, 1971 | The United Arab Emirates formally declares independence; |
| | inherits the territorial disputes from the emirates. |
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On November 29, 1971, under intense pressure, the ruler of Sharjah entered into a last-minute Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Imperial Iran regarding Abu Musa. The agreement did not resolve the ultimate question of sovereignty but allowed Iran to station troops on the northern half of the island while maintaining Sharjah’s civil administration, policing, and oil revenues on the southern half.
The Sheikhdom of Ras al-Khaimah, however, adamantly refused to compromise on the Tunb islands. Consequently, on November 30, 1971—exactly two days before the formal declaration of independence of the United Arab Emirates—the Imperial Iranian Navy carried out amphibious operations to seize both Greater and Lesser Tunb by military force. The takeover turned lethal on Greater Tunb, where a brief firefight broke out between invading Iranian forces and a handful of local Ras al-Khaimah police officers, resulting in casualties on both sides.
When the UAE officially federated on December 2, 1971, the new central government inherited these unresolved territorial claims. The Shah’s actions faced muted international pushback because Western powers viewed Iran as a stable, pro-Western guardian of the Gulf’s critical energy corridors.
3. Conflicting Legal and Diplomatic Stances
Following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the new clerical regime in Tehran completely discarded the Shah’s pro-Western orientation but fundamentally preserved his nationalist territorial doctrines. In the decades that followed, Iran steadily eroded the 1971 joint administration agreement over Abu Musa. By 1992, Iran had restricted access for UAE municipal workers, expanded its military footprint, built an airstrip, and effectively assumed de facto total administrative control over all three islands.
The United Arab Emirates’ Position
The UAE’s diplomatic strategy relies on international law, multilateralism, and regional consensus. Backed consistently by resolutions from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Arab League, Abu Dhabi frames the current status of the islands as an ongoing, illegal foreign military occupation.
The UAE bases its sovereignty claims on continuous administrative usage, historical ties to the Qasimi dynasty of rulers, and the fact that Iran took the islands via unprovoked military force right before British treaty protections expired. The UAE has repeatedly extended public offers to resolve the dispute through bilateral negotiations or via binding arbitration before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague.
The Islamic Republic of Iran’s Position
Iran systematically rejects any international legal arbitration regarding the islands. Tehran maintains that its sovereignty over Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb is historic, absolute, and non-negotiable.
From the Iranian perspective, the 1971 actions were a legitimate historical restitution, returning ancient Persian territories seized by British colonialists. Iranian officials view the UAE’s push for ICJ arbitration as a Western-backed attempt to weaken Iran’s defensive perimeter. The official stance of the Iranian government remains that any third-party discussion or international statement questioning its absolute ownership constitutes a direct violation of its domestic territorial integrity.
4. Military Fortification: “Unsinkable Aircraft Carriers”
The primary reason these islands provoke such intense concern among global military planners is how Iran has integrated them into its modern asymmetric defense doctrine. In contemporary warfare, these three outposts act as what academic and military strategists term “unsinkable aircraft carriers.”
Rather than relying purely on a conventional surface navy that could be overwhelmed by major global powers, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) has turned these islands into fortified, static missile platforms and monitoring stations.
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| IRGCN ASYMMETRIC MILITARY ASSETS |
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| Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles | Stationed in underground, reinforced bunkers|
| (ASCMs) | capable of targeting deep-water tankers.|
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| Fast Attack Craft (FAC) | Stationed in protected harbors; utilized for|
| | swarm tactics and vessel interceptions. |
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| Early Warning Radar Systems| High-powered arrays providing continuous |
| | tracking of all Gulf air and sea traffic. |
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| Surface-to-Air Missiles | Air defense batteries shielding the islands |
| (SAMs) | from aerial bombardment. |
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By placing anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), sophisticated early warning radar, and long-range drones on Abu Musa and the Tunbs, Iran can project threat capability across the entire narrow throat of the Strait of Hormuz. Commercial oil tankers exiting the Gulf must pass within miles of these missile batteries.
Furthermore, the harbors built on Abu Musa and Greater Tunb house fleets of highly maneuverable fast-attack craft. In times of high regional friction, these small vessels can rapidly deploy to drop naval mines, conduct swarm operations against larger warships, or board merchant ships. This turns the territorial dispute into an active component of global maritime security.
5. Strategic Realities in the Present Day
The critical status of the three islands was brought to the forefront during recent operations. Amid broader military hostilities, characterized by a prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz and tight naval blockades, the outposts became central targets of containment efforts.
The U.S. military, operating via Central Command, conducted heavily publicized daylight airstrikes against Greater Tunb. These operations specifically targeted underground cruise missile storage bunkers, radar installations, and defensive command networks built by the IRGC. The objective of these strikes was to systematically degrade Iran’s capacity to harass commercial oil tankers and enforce its unilateral restrictions over the waterway.
| Metric | Strategic Significance |
| Global Trade Impact | Controls entry/exit for ~20-25% of global seaborne oil and 20% of LNG. |
| Tactical Location | Positioned directly adjacent to the naturally deepest deep-water shipping lanes. |
| Recent Status | Heavily struck by U.S. CENTCOM forces to degrade Iranian anti-ship cruise missile capabilities. |
| Diplomatic Outcome | Provisional management left under Iranian control following the June memorandum. |
Despite the extensive physical damage inflicted on these island bases during active operations, the fundamental diplomatic deadlock remains unresolved. In the diplomatic negotiations that structured the cessation of hostilities—culminating in the recent June memorandum—the provisional administrative management of the transit lanes was left under Iranian oversight.
This reality has raised significant long-term anxieties for the United Arab Emirates and its international partners. Analysts note that the longer Iran maintains uninterrupted physical possession and operational administration of the islands, the harder it becomes to challenge their de facto integration into Iran’s sovereign domain through international law or diplomatic mediation.
Conclusion: The Permanent Flashpoint
The dispute over Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb serves as a stark reminder of how geography shapes geopolitical power. These islands are not merely pieces of disputed real estate between two neighboring Gulf nations; they are highly leveraged assets that hold a literal chokehold over the global energy supply chain.
For the United Arab Emirates, reclaiming the islands or subjecting them to the International Court of Justice represents a vital quest for historical justice, international law, and long-term national security. For Iran, maintaining absolute control over these outposts is viewed as a vital national interest, core to its strategy of deterring foreign military intervention and controlling access to its home waters.
As long as the global economy remains dependent on the steady, unhindered flow of hydrocarbons through the Strait of Hormuz, these three tiny, rocky outposts will remain among the most critical, heavily armed, and intensely monitored pieces of territory on Earth.
